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THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTIONS WERE ADOPTED BY THE TWO UPPER
CLASSES, PUPILS OF THE LATE PROF. E. J. PHELPS.
WHEREAS, It has pleased God to remove from the post he
has so faithfully occupied, Professor Edward John Phelps, the
students in the Yale Law School desire to record their sense of
the loss which they have sustained by his decease, and of the
still heavier loss sustained by those who were nearest and
dearest to him; and, therefore, be it
Resolved, That it is but paying a grateful tribute to his mem-
ory to say that this event calls us to mourn for one who was in
every way worthy of our respect and regard, whose kindly
instruction, clear as it was profound, will ever be among the
most cherished recollections of our Law School work; a citizen
whose upright and noble life will ever afford an inspiration to
us; and
Resolved, That the heartfelt sympathy of his pupils in the
Yale Law School be extended to the members of his family in
their affliction, and that a copy of these resolutions be trans-
mitted to Mrs. Phelps in token of our affectionate respect for a
good man and great teacher gone to his rest.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW-PRIZES.
It is rather exceptional to find actual adjudication upon ques-
tions of international law, and were it only for this fact, the recent
decision of the United States Supreme Court, in the case of In re
Pugnette Habana, The Sola, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 29 o , would be of in-
terest. But the case presents a point which has very seldom arisen,
and about which there is much diversity of opinion, thus making it
of particular interest. It arose out of the seizure during the recent
war with Spain, of certain fishing vessels flying the Spanish flag,
manned by Spaniards, but carrying no arms, and engaged only in
the peaceful trade of fishermen. These vessels were condemned as
prizes of war and the Supreme Court now holds their condemnation
unlawful. Fuller, Harlan and McKenna, J. J., dissenting.
The question involved in this case is dependent directly upon the
development of international law. It touches upon just that period
in the development of a rule of law where it merges from the state
of comity and custom into the actual embodiment as a recognized
rule. In the early days it was a matter of comity to except fishing
smacks from capture. They were the means of providing suste-
nance for the peasant population of a nation, and for that reason
were looked upon with favor. This view was held as early as 1784,
during the difficulties that arose between England and Holland.
2 Code Des Prizes 721-9Ol, and again during the Portugal-French
troubles in 18ol. 2 De Cussy Droit Maritime 166. It was then
distinctly recognized as a rule of comity and not of legal decisions,
and the dissenting justices in the present case still h6ld to this
view. But in the opinion of the court exemption of fishing smacks
from capture can no longer be considered a matter of comity, but a
rule of international law, to be recognized and sanctioned as such.
Treating this exemption as a matter of comity possesses many obvi-
ous advantages, the surrender of -which was not, perhaps, altogether
wise. Yet so uniform and oft repeated does this custom seem to
have been, and so in line with the general tendency of international
law in its relation to the government of war, that the correctness of
the court's decision can hardly be questioned.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERFERENCE WITH INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE BY QUARANTINE REGULATIONS-PARTIES.
The Supreme Court in deciding the case of State of Louisiana v.
State of Texas et al., 20 Sup: Ct. Rep. 251, permits legal uncertainty
to still obscure the division line at which internal police powers and
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the regulation of interstate commerce overlap. The facts reveal a
unique question of law. We find a complaint held demurrable in
which the Governor and Health Officer of Texas, empowered by
legislative authority to regulate quarantines, are alleged as unlaw-
fully restricting interstate commerce by placing an embargo on all
goods from New Orleans, under pretext of quarantine regulations
because of a single case of smallpox in that city, but ulteriorly for
the purpose of excluding Louisiana products for the benefit of home
producers. Chief Justice Fuller, writing the opinion of the court,
holds the alleged damage a grievance to the individual merchants,
and not to the State. There can be no doubt of the correctness of
this decision; nevertheless, the question remains: May a State at
its pleasure exclude such interstate commerce as it chooses merely
by advancing as a reason (either bona fide or by way of pretext).
that the products are excluded as a police regulation for the health
of its people. The present decision considered in connection with
the'I ith amendment to the Federal Constitution and the decision- of
the Supreme Court in the case of State of New York v. State of
Louisiana, 1o8 U. S. 76, acquaints us with the fact that the inability
of the State of Louisiana to be a proper party plaintiff in the preseit
case is shared also by the particular merchants aggrieved, in con-
sequence of their incapacity to sue a sove'feign State. And further.
the law passed by the Texas Legislature giving certain officials dis-
cretionary power to regulate quarantines is perfectly valid as a
police regulation. New York v. Mich., II Pet. io2, Story Const. L.,
5th Ed., Vol. 2, 22 n. The wrong lying in the action of the officers
in its enforcement.
A substitution of the officers instead -of the State as respondents
would then permit the individual merchants to bring their bill. The
only difficulty remaining being the discretionary public character
of respondents' official duties. But if the embargo be so unreason-
able as to amount not to misdirected discretion, but to a wilful and
malicious act, under pretext of discharging official duty, such offi-
cials are held amenable to suit for damages or an injunction. Cooley
on Torts, i88o Ed. 378, the act being "colore officio ;". Perry v.
Reynolds, 53 Conn.
Still the question remains if bona fide yet unreasonable police
regulations interfere with interstate commerce, do the courts afford
relief? The strongest argument for the negative of this question is
found in the oleomargarine case, 127 U. S. 678, in which case the
Supreme Court refused to inquire into the reasonableness of a law
'interfering with interstate commerce in forbidding the sale oleo-
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margarine as a police regulation in protection of health, even though
it was shown that oleomargarine was a healthful food. Judge
Dillon's criticism of the case is very severe, declaring such a de-
cision enough to make one's blood tingle. Dillon Mun. Cor., p.
21 n. However, the better rule is set forth in a number of well con-
sidered cases discussed in the case of Minn. v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313.
In this case an act providing for the inspection of cattle, sheep, etc.,
before killing was declared void as an unreasonable police regula-
tion interfering with interstate commerce, the court making special
inquiry into the reasonableness of the regulation. The weight of
authority seems clearly to support the proposition that every citizen
of the United States has a right to export his goods into a sister
State, unless it interferes with proper police regulations of such State,
without regard to what that State may consider a proper regulation.
Hence, in the present case, even though the Texas officials act
bona fide and in the exercise of discretion, still, it seems, if the regu-
lation be unreasonable, the New Orleans merchants might file a
non-demurrable bill, alleging these facts, as the regulation must be
subjected to a test of reasonableness by the court, and not deter-
mined by the bona fide exercise of State officials' discretion.
Justice Brown, in his concurring opinion, also suggests that the
State of Louisiana might maintain such a bill were the embargo
against the products from the entire State.
"SURVIVAL ACTS'--INSTANTANEOUS DEATH-AMOUNT OF DAMAGES.
In the case of Broughel v. Southern New England Telephone Com-
pany, 45 Atl. Rep. 435, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has es-
tablished the doctrine that instantaneous death does not prevent the
personal representative of the-deceased from recovering substantial
damages for his intestate's death occurring through defendant's
negligence. The Connecticut statute belongs to that class of acts
which have been called "survival acts," i. e., acts providing that
decedent's cause of action shall survive to the administrator or
beneficiaries as distinct from those acts which create a new right of
action to the beneficiaries for their loss. Under the latter class of
actions, of course, the period within which death results cannot
affect the cause of action, but under the "survival acts" Massa-
chusetts and Mississippi hold that no recovery can be had where
death is instantaneous, as there is no cause of action to survive an
instantaneous death. This objection could be of no weight in Con-
necticut, as the statute was amended so that the cause of action
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should survive whether death was instantaneous or not, or, in other
words, so that the administrator could recover at least nominal
damages, even where no damage could be proved. Under the
"survival acts" it has generally been held that the administrator
could recover only the damages the decedent could have recovered
on account of his sufferings, but in this case, although the trial judge
found, as a matter of fact, that "death was instantaneous, and he
suffered no pain or sensation, and never regained consciousness,"
and therefore awarded nominal damages, the judgment is set aside
and a new trial granted for ascertaining and assessing the quantum
of damages. The upper court shows conclusively that under the
Connecticut statute the cause of action survives even where death
is instantaneous, and the general approval with which this has been
received by the press, shows in how close touch the bench is with
the best public opinion.
